Ballot positions often affect the electoral performance of parties. Existing theories for this effect focus on voter-specific behavioral explanations. We present evidence on an additional unexplored mechanism: parties adjust their behavior to account for their position on the ballot. This adjustment matters for how we interpret existing results. First, we use a constituency level lottery of ballot positions across two elections and 1971 races in Colombia. We find evidence for a ballot position effect of 6.7 percent on vote share, and 8.8 percent on seat share. Second, we show that parties raise and spend more money on their campaigns if they are allocated a top spot on the ballot. Finally, we show that campaign spending is correlated with higher vote shares. Our results suggest that the existing literature may be overstating the contribution of the voter behavioral channel on ballot order effects.
Aberrant behavior at the polling booth has had the attention of political scientists for a long time. One such behavior is the tendency of voters to vote disproportionately more for parties listed at the top of the ballot, regardless of the identity of the party (Krosnick, Miller and Tichy, 2004; Ho and Imai, 2008; Blom-Hansen et al., 2016) . Existing, mostly behavioral, explanations for the reasons for this effect focus on voters on election day. This paper argues that ballot order effects maybe augmented, or countervailed, if parties adjust their campaigns in response to where they are placed on the ballot. A part of the documented effect in the decades old literature may therefore emerge through a party channel rather than the voter channel. In theory, this channel may also be the reason why several scholars find null effects of ballot order randomization.
We study the case of Colombia where party positions in each ballot for local Mayors and Councilors for every municipality in the country are assigned through lotteries. We combine three data sources: election data for two elections in Colombia -Mayors and Councils; scans of 2196 races machine and hand coded for party positions on the ballots; and new campaign revenue and spending data at the transaction level for each party on every ballot for all of Colombia.
First, we establish the existence of the ballot order effect in Colombia. We show that being on the top row on the ballot causes an increase in party vote-share by 0.8 percent points, a treatment effect of 6.6 percent. Since ballot positions are randomized at the race level, we also observe an effect of 8.78 percent on a party's seat share. Second, we present evidence on how parties adjust campaigns in response to the ballot order. Parties in the top row raise 11.68 percent more money and spend an equivalent amount on campaigning. Additional tests show that the increased spending is mostly on publicity and electioneering. Finally, we show that there exists a correlation between higher expenditure and vote share in our sample. This paper makes several contributions. First, we introduce and test for a new mechanism for a large body of literature on ballot order effects that spans several decades, and more broadly on election day factors' effect on voting (Brians and Grofman, 2001; Addonizio, Green and Glaser, 2007; Ansolabehere, 2009) . The ballot order effects we observe can arise through a party strategic response channel in addition, or instead of, a behavioral channel (Lau and Redlawsk, 2001; Augenblick and Nicholson, 2015) . This is in line with recent work that argues that voters may be more strategic (and less behavioral) in their actions than is commonly assumed (Ashworth, De Mesquita and Friedenberg, 2018) . Second, we add evidence on ballot order effects from elections at two levels of government from a developing country to a literature that is dominated by research on the US, with a few examples from other developed democracies (Blom-Hansen et al., 2016) . Instead of being larger as predicted by a theory that argues that less educated voters may rely more on heuristics, the point estimates we observe are similar in magnitude to other studies from the US.
A Party-Based Mechanism
The order in which candidates and parties appear on the ballot can affect their electoral performance.
1 A large body of work either explicitly tests for (Bagley, 1965; Ho and Imai, 2008; Koppell and Steen, 2004; Meredith and Salant, 2013; Kim, Krosnick and Casasanto, 2015; Taebel, 1975; Geys and Heyndels, 2003; Blom-Hansen et al., 2016) or suggests that a 1 We reproduce Table 1 from Blom-Hansen et al. (2016) in Appendix Table A1 . The table provides a review of work on ballot order effects from the US and abroad that address empirical issues in the earlier literature.
3 voter-based mechanism explains why ballot-order effect exists (Alvarez, Sinclair and Hasen, 2006; Chen et al., 2014; Darcy, 1986; Miller and Krosnick, 1998; Gold, 1952; Faas and Schoen, 2006; King and Leigh, 2009) . As illustrated in Figure 2 , voters are often decision-fatigued and operate in low information environments, and as a consequence, may resort to heuristics to make a decision. For example, under the 'primacy' hypothesis, voters are more likely to choose names listed on the top of the ballot because they begin searching the ballot with an aim to confirm a choice rather than reject it. 'Recency' effects exist when people chose the last listed name because they search the ballot in a low information environment looking for specific reasons to vote for a party but reached the end undecided (Krosnick, 1991) . Most recent work finds evidence for 'primacy' effects, which is the focus of our empirical analysis below. Finally, another explanation models 'satisficing' voters, who accept the first solution presented to them for the voting problem (Simon, 1957) .
We present an additional account that focuses on party and candidate behavior for why ballot order effects might exist. It is evident from previous work that candidates care a lot about the order in which they appear on the ballot. Which of the two effects is larger is an empirical question that we explore below. Our objective is to demonstrate the existence of a ballot order effect on party behavior. Importantly, since party mechanism may operate in either direction, this mechanism may be the missing advisories/key-dates-june-7-california-primary/, accessed Jan 20, 2018 explanation for why some studies in the literature find no effect of the ballot order (see Appendix Table A1 ).
Background

Local Elections in Colombia
Colombia is currently divided into 1098 municipalities located within 32 departments, where 
Random assignment of position in ballots
Currently there is a simple plurality rule for electing Mayors, and each party is allowed to present a single candidate. Voters are allowed to cast one vote per party/candidate. An example of the ballot is present in 2. In the case of councils a proportional representation Table 1 presents a schedule of the electoral calendar. Parties announce their intention to run and provide a list of candidates to the local registry. Once the list is finalized, a lottery on the party position in the ballot takes place. Importantly, a party's decision to run is unaffected by the position in the ballot since the randomization takes place after the decision to run.
This randomization is done for every election and level (Mayors and Councils separately)
and is independently verified. 5 Parties are allowed to be present at the randomization. 
Data
We use the electoral data compiled by Pachón and Sánchez (2014) . We combine these with election results obtained directly from the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil. We calculate the vote share for parties, the seat share, and the number of seats obtained. In order to code the position in the ballot we obtained scans of all ballots for Mayors and Councils in 2015 (N=2196). Using hand coding and an optical character recognition package in Python, we coded if the party was on top of the ballot. However not all ballots have more than one row, therefore we drop them from the analysis since there is no variation on who is in top.
This happens only for Mayor ballots which are squared.
We also obtain data on campaign income and spending from the National Electoral Commission 6 . For each candidate, these data reports the total income of the campaign, broken National Electoral Council -a non partisan entity would be in charge of ensuring the randomization of party position within each ballot.
down by source of income, if the income of the campaign came from the candidate's own sources, donations, or the party. Similarly, the data report total expenditure, broken down by the expenditure items. A detailed breakdown is given in Appendix Tables A2 and A3 .
Estimation
We assemble a party-ballot level dataset and run regressions of the following form:
where outcomes, Y pc , are measured for each party p in each constituency c. T op Row pc is an indicator variable for whether the party enters the ballot in the top row. We include ballot fixed effects (α c ) in the regression to account for common shocks at the race level. Since the lottery assigns unique numbers to the party, we also include party fixed effects (γ p ) so that we only compare within party variation. To account for spillovers in voter and party decisions, we cluster standard errors at the ballot level.
Balance
To test the validity of random assignment of ballot position, we construct data on party characteristics. For instance, one concern is that bigger parties are able to manipulate the system to be systematically be on top of the ballot. We code party size (measured as the number of municipalities the party contests in), if the party has participated in more than one election, as well as their previous vote share where they ran in the previous election for the same constituency. We also code if parties are right leaning (Fergusson et al., 2017) or cnecuentasclaras.com/ minorities, as well as if they are one of the two main traditional parties. Appendix Table A4 shows that we have good balance on these variables using our main specification above. Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the ballot level, are in parentheses. Each observation denotes a party within a ballot. All races with more than one row on the ballot are included in the regression.
Results
We begin by analyzing if a top position on the ballot translates into better electoral performance for parties. Table 2 shows strong positive results for councils. We observe that being in the top row increases a party's vote share by 0.8 percent points, which translates to a treatment effect of about 6.6 percent. The randomization occurs at the race level, the treatment also affects actual electoral outcomes: the top row of council ballots increases the seat share of parties by 1.1 percent points, and there is an 8.78 percent increase in the probability of an additional seat for the party. This is verified by the increase in the number of seats won by the party in column 3. Finally, we do not observe any effect of being allocated the top row in the electoral performance of mayors, which might be due to the higher salience of 11 election or differences in the shape of the ballot as mentioned above. Moreover the ballot has additional information such as a picture of the candidate and the name. Most importantly, since we observe no effects on mayors, we can use these elections as a placebo case to study the campaign effects we explore below. Next, we analyze campaign income and spending data to test if getting the top position affects the way parties behave before the election day. We present the overall results below in Table 3 . Consistent with a party/candidate mechanism, we find that parties who are allocated the top row in council election have raise campaign incomes and by about 11.5 percent. In Appendix Tables A6 to A9, we break the results into official reporting categories.
We find that the increase in income comes primarily from candidates' own income and not additional donations or loans. This suggests that the change in behavior from an anticipated voter bump which emerges specifically from the candidates on the ballot. In addition, we find that the top row party candidates also spend statistically significantly more money on Administrative expenses and Transport and Mailing expenses. A story consistent with these effects is that the candidates are sending out more campaign material via post, an activity that would be recorded under these two budget heads. In addition, the point estimate on general electioneering expenses is also positive and large, albeit not statistically significantly different from zero. If we add this point estimate to the treatment effects on administration and mailing costs, the total comes out to 70.74 additional pesos per registered voter which gets very close to the treatment effect in Column 2 in Table 3 , which would suggest the additional spendings is done to obtain more votes. Finally, as expected, we observe no consistent effects on Mayors' campaign income or expenditure.
To further probe the robustness of the previous result, we code if the transaction-level notes on campaign spending contain words that signal that the expense is related to publicity.
This new outcome variable takes on the value of the transaction, normalized by registered voters, if the transaction description contained words like 'posters' and 'flyers'. 7 We again find that the point estimate on this variable is in the vicinity of the effect in Table 3 and it only comes out significant for Councils.
Finally, we also find that every 1,000 pesos spent per registered voter is correlated with 0.028 in vote share and 0.036 in seat share. 8 While this final result is purely correlational, it does signal that, controlling for party and ballot characteristics, more campaigning yields higher vote shares in our sample. Table A10 for key words used and Table A11 for the results.
8 See Appendix Table A12 for these correlations. 9 We do not partition the data by the top spot on the ballot as campaign spending is post-treatment.
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Consistent with existing results, results indicate that party location in the ballot affects their electoral results -voters vote for the parties located on top independent of constituency and party characteristics. We present evidence that parties also react to ballot positions by raising and spending more money, particularly on publicity. Finally, there exists a correlation between higher spending and vote share. Our results show that previously estimated ballot order effects my be overstating the contribution of a behavioral channel. Further research should examine the conditions under which parties will reduce or increase their campaigning. Chen et al. (2014) Positive effect of being listed first Darcy (1986) No position effect Ho and Imai (2008) Positive effect of being listed first Koppell and Steen (2004) Positive effect of being listed first Krosnick, Miller and Tichy (2004) Positive effect of being listed first Meredith and Salant (2013) Positive effect of being listed first Miller and Krosnick (1998) Positive effect of being listed first
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Other experimental studies from the USA Bagley ( Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the ballot level, are in parentheses. Each observation denotes a party within a ballot. All races with more than one row on the ballot are included in the regression.
iv Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the ballot level, are in parentheses. Each observation denotes a party within a ballot. All races with more than one row on the ballot are included in the regression. See Table A5 for a description of the variables. The outcomes are measured in persos per registered voters.
v Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the ballot level, are in parentheses. Each observation denotes a party within a ballot. All races with more than one row on the ballot are included in the regression. See Table A5 for a description of the variables. The outcomes are measured in persos per registered voters. Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the ballot level, are in parentheses. Each observation denotes a party within a ballot. All races with more than one row on the ballot are included in the regression. See Table A5 for a description of the variables. The outcomes are measured in persos per registered voters. Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the ballot level, are in parentheses. Each observation denotes a party within a ballot. All races with more than one row on the ballot are included in the regression. See Table A5 for a description of the variables. The outcomes are measured in persos per registered voters.
vi Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the ballot level, are in parentheses. Each observation denotes a party within a ballot. All races with more than one row on the ballot are included in the regression. See Table A10 for key words. When a key word is found in the transaction description, that transaction's value is added to the new variable. Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the ballot level, are in parentheses. Each observation denotes a party within a ballot. All races with more than one row on the ballot are included in the regression.
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